

ISSN (Print) 2723-3413 - ISSN (Online) 2722-3663

DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.30596%2Fnomoi.v3i2.12263>**PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM POST CONSOLIDATION  
ELECTION 2019: MEASUREMENT OF THE THRESHOLD  
STRENGTH OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES****Mhd Ansor Lubis****Faculty of Law, Universitas Medan Area, Jl. Kolam No. 1 Medan Estate,  
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**ABSTRACT**

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*The implementation of the General Election for President and Vice President in its development has not been able to become a means of transforming social change in the desired direction and does not significantly prove the influence of simultaneous elections on governance in the President's power. The Nomination Threshold in the Design of the Election Law actually creates a coalition of parties that has the potential to damage a healthy and accountable political system, namely the gathering of parties in one support for a presidential candidate which is then not matched by the existence of an opposition within the Check and Balance framework. The research method used in this paper is a normative juridical research method. Normative research with a statutory approach and a conceptual approach. The results of the study obtained include, strengthening the presidential system through the presidential candidate threshold after the election consolidation is less effective and tends to eliminate the rights of citizens to be able to vote, nominate themselves and nominate candidates.*

**Keywords: Presidential, Threshold, Election**

**Journal History**

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**INTRODUCTION**

The current reform marks a turning point for the Indonesian people to assess the application of the principle of popular sovereignty which has been seen as the minimum boundary between the old and new order regimes. The climax was the amendment to the text of the 1945 Constitution, in particular the

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provisions that specifically regulate the strengthening of the Indonesian presidential system.<sup>1</sup>

The strengthening of the presidential system will indirectly affect the process of electing the president and vice president, as agreed by the MPR at the beginning of the 1945 constitutional reform process, said Jimly Assiddiqie, making the president responsible for its implementation. With the movement of the people in the presidential system directly, not through the MPR, Indonesia has so far changed from the election of president and vice president by the MPR (indirect democracy) to the election of president and vice president directly by the DPR, the people. Electoral system (direct democracy).<sup>2</sup>

The momentum for changing the electoral system does not necessarily alleviate Indonesia's constitutional problems. Article 6A Paragraph (2) and 22E Paragraph (3) provide hegemony and dominance of political parties, from mere nominations to nominations for the Presidential-Vice Presidential pair, DPR deputy candidates, and even DPR Deputy Candidates. It seems to make a difference to the political map of the New Order regime, with the scope of the State DPRD as a Provincial/City DPRD.

This can be seen in the basic agreement to amend the 1945 Constitution which is to strengthen the presidential government system. The basic agreement was then manifested in the amendments to the 1945 Constitution which strengthened the characteristics of the presidential system, namely:

1. Establishing a permanent term of office of the President followed by an arrangement regarding impeachment only for constitutional reasons;<sup>3</sup>
2. Direct elections by the people<sup>4</sup> so that the President is not responsible to the assembly/representative body;<sup>5</sup>
3. The President is the head of government as well as the head of state, affirming the separation of powers which is at least marked by the affirmation of the power to form laws by the DPR;<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) formulated 5 agreements that became the basis for the amendments to the Constitution, namely: (1) The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution would not be changed; (2) The form of a unitary state will be maintained; (3) The presidential government system will be strengthened; (4) The explanation of the Constitution is omitted while its normative content is used as the contents of the articles of the Constitution; and (5) Amendments are made with an addendum, in Saldi Isra, (Saldi Isra, *Pergeseran Fungsi Legislasi, Menguatnya Model Legislasi Parlementer dalam Sistem Presidensial di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2013), p. 19

<sup>2</sup> Jimly Asshiddiqie, *Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme*, (Jakarta: Sinar Graphic, 2010), p. 62-63

<sup>3</sup> See the provisions of the 1945 Constitution, Article 7A and Article 7B

<sup>4</sup> See Provisions of the 1945 Constitution, Article 6A

<sup>5</sup> See Provisions of the 1945 Constitution, Article 3A

<sup>6</sup> See the provisions of the 1945 Constitution, Article 4 and Article 20

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4. The position of minister is appointed and dismissed by the president, an advisory institution that is not separate as a state institution itself but is formed by the President.<sup>7</sup>

The acknowledgment that is made through strengthening or improvement is based on the experience of the constitutional journey in government under the 1945 Constitution. The constitution is claimed to be a "unique system" of the presidential system. There is no going back to a parliamentary system, as was the case in the 1950.<sup>8</sup>

In a parliamentary system of government, the relationship between the executive and representative bodies is very close, this is due to the accountability of the ministers to the parliament, and the cabinet formed must have the support of the majority vote of the parliament. In a presidential system, the executive does not depend on the people's representative body. The legal basis of executive power is returned to the people.<sup>9</sup>

When compared between the presidential system of government and the parliamentary system of government, there are some very significant differences, these differences include:<sup>10</sup>

1. in a parliamentary system of government the head of government is usually held by the prime minister, the government is the executive who relies on the trust of the legislature, while in a presidential system of government the head of government is called the president, who is elected for a certain term of office that has been determined in the constitution and under normal circumstances cannot forced to resign by the legislature except by impeachment.
2. the head of government in a presidential system is directly elected by the people, while in a parliamentary system the head of state comes from the party that wins the election. Third, the parliamentary system of government has a collegial executive, the Prime Minister and the ministers are responsible individually or jointly to the parliament, while in a presidential system of government the government is a single executive, namely the president.

The two existing systems of government, namely parliamentary and presidential, certainly have advantages and disadvantages, which can be detailed as follows: The advantages of the presidential system, executive stability is based on the president's term of office. It is considered more democratic because the

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<sup>7</sup> Abolition of the Supreme Advisory Council

<sup>8</sup> Sarah Nur Aini Siregar, *Indonesia's Presidential System From Soekarno to Jokowi*, (Jakarta: Indonesian Obor Library Foundation, 2018), p. 28

<sup>9</sup> M. Kusnardi, *Sistem Presidensiil Indonesia Dari Soekarno ke Jokowi*, (Jakarta: Center for Legal Studies HTN FH UI, 1983)

<sup>10</sup> Mahmuzar, *istem Pemerintahan Indonesia Menurut UUD 1945 Sebelum dan Sesudah Amandemen*, (Bandung: Nusa Media, 2010), p. 76

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direct election of the head of government is carried out by the people through direct elections, the presidential power becomes more legitimate because it gets a direct mandate from the people. There is a clear separation of powers which means that the government's power is limited so that it indirectly provides more protection to the people. The advantages of a parliamentary system are that conflicts between the government and parliament are rare, and adjustments between the executive and the legislature are easy to achieve.

The weaknesses of these two systems of government are: The weakness of the parliamentary system is that it cannot protect the people because the government is from the majority party, and it is easy to conspire to reject the aspirations of the people. Tend to be in conflict between the legislature and the executive, the government can be overthrown by a vote of no confidence parliament.<sup>11</sup>

The strengthening of the government regimes, both the Congress and the President through amendments to the 1945 Constitution, still causes many problems, at least in two respects. First, is the draft amendment to the 1945 Constitution to strengthen the president proven to strengthen the presidential institution? This issue at the constitutional level is fundamental because the interpretation of the 1945 Constitution provides a further way to strengthen the presidential system through legislation. Call it the constitutional issue of the presidential election round, the threshold for presidential and vice presidential nominations, the timing of the general election. Because the constitution only provides things and basic principles. This gives the DPR and the President, as legislative bodies, broad powers and opportunities to make further provisions on constitutional delegation and to enact laws. These broad strengths and opportunities apply mainly to policy issues, based on the assumption that this is the domain of "elected institutions", so "political issues" are not justified in "open law politics". enjoy sex. legislation. The forms include the Election Law, the Party Law, the Law on the Department of Foreign Affairs, which of course are related to the regulation of the election threshold and time within the framework of the presidential issue. Regarding the issue of institutional structuring of political bodies, including the DPR and MPR bodies, and the idea of a presidential bill.

Regarding elections, one of the reasons for holding elections at the same time is to strengthen the presidential system. Although the president has a strong position under his 1945 Constitution, the president and his DPR are based on popular legitimacy and are on an equal footing, creating a political stalemate. This affects the stability and effectiveness of government in a presidential government. Simultaneous elections for presidential and vice-presidential elections as well as elections for members of representative bodies can be held in initial, permanent

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<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*,

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and long-term coalitions. It is hoped that within the framework of this coalition, the formation of a coalition cabinet is an indicator of cooperation and participation in the ruling coalition. However, the 2019 simultaneous regional elections showed a negligible and negligible effect on the party's vote acquisition. On the one hand, the camouflage effect did not work and the president's low contribution to the party's vote made the cabinet formation unreliable. On the other hand, because the president has a strong position in the presidential system, he is still free to determine the composition of his cabinet without being completely tied to the initial coalition in the presidential election. Therefore, the issue of the nomination threshold, and the various tests of the provisions of Article 222 of the General Election Law which regulates the nomination threshold, must be seriously considered because the effect will not be effective.

## **METHOD**

The research method used in this paper is a normative juridical research method. Normative research requires a statutory approach and a conceptual approach. The data collection technique used is through the study of documents and literature on secondary data in the form of primary, secondary and tertiary legal materials. This research uses socio-legal research methods by conducting research in the field with a direct interview method to the residents of Wadas village. Empirical studies are studies that view law as reality, covering social reality, cultural reality, etc., the empirical study of the world is *das sin* (what is reality). Empirical legal research focuses on behaviors that develop in society, or the workings of law in society. So the law is conceptualized as actual *behavior* which includes actions and their consequences in social life relationships. Therefore, the approaches and often used in empirical legal research include on The approach of sociology of law, The approach of legal anthropology, The approach of legal psychology.<sup>12</sup>

## **DISCUSSION**

### **Strengthening the Presidential Government System**

The proportional electoral system that is implemented in conjunction with the presidential system and the multi-party system is often perceived as not ideal, including in the case in Indonesia. The proportional system requires that no votes in political parties are wasted like in the district system so that many political parties are accommodated in parliament so that they are fragmented, only that a

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<sup>12</sup> Eka NAM Sihombing, Cynthia Hadita, *Penelitian Hukum*, (Malang: Intrans Publishing, 2022), p. 48.

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threshold requirement is formed to limit the number of effective political parties in parliament (parliamentary threshold).<sup>13</sup>

In some terms, fragmentation has become a common reference used to describe the wide variety of political backgrounds that are accommodated in parliament, as a result, voting in each compartment of the board's equipment, including commissions and plenary sessions, becomes ineffective. There are at least three reasons why the combination of the Presidential system and the multi-party system tends to be problematic, namely :

- a. Multi-party-based presidential systems tend to lead to deadlock in the relationship between the executive and the legislature so that the work of government becomes ineffective;
- b. Multiparty systems tend to create ideological polarization than two-party systems;
- c. The combination of the two systems also has implications for the difficulty of forming inter-party coalitions in a presidential system;

Problems that occur in determining the presidential election coalition to carry the candidates for President and Vice President exist after the determination of the fragmentary legislative seats. Political lobbying occurs everywhere, pragmatic, and briefly becomes a sharp pebble which also often occurs anywhere, including in Indonesia. As a result, the elected government is held hostage both by its own supporting forces and by the opposition.

If during the New Order the government took bureaucrats, the military, and Golkar hostage with their pork barrel politics, including members of the DPR and MPR who were appointed by the President so that they were always acclamative in supporting the ruling regime. In contrast to the post-Reformation conditions where the hostage is the government, namely by the political forces that support themselves and the opposition.<sup>14</sup> Actually, the MPR in discussing the amendments to the Constitution has tried to prevent the presidential system from being reduced or reduced either naturally through a dictatorial and authoritarian model, or politically, namely the power of parliament that exceeds the government (*legislative heavy*).<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Jose Antonio Cheibub stated that divided government will occur in a presidential system of government if: (1) there are too many effective political parties; (2) does not apply a majoritarian electoral system, but uses a proportional electoral system to elect parliament, and (3) presidential elections and parliamentary elections are not conducted simultaneously. In Ramlan Surbakti, *Menyederhanakan Waktu Penyelenggaraan Pemilu: Pemilu Nasional dan Pemilu Daerah, Kemitraan bagi Pembaruan Tata Pemerintahan*, Jakarta, 2011, p. 9

<sup>14</sup> Syamsuddin Haris, Ramlan Surbakti, *Pemilu Nasional Serentak 2019*, (Jakarta: Electoral Research Institute- Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, 2015), p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> Sulardi, *Collegial President: Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia Masa Depan*, (Malang: UMM Press, 2000), p. 7

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In a democratic regime, there are three models of government systems: a parliamentary system, a presidential system and a mixed system. Donald S. Lutz stated that in a parliamentary system, the executive is headed by the prime minister who is part of the legislature.<sup>16</sup> In a presidential system, the executive is directly elected by the people and is not part of the legislature. In a presidential constitution, the president or other designations are the head of state and head of government with a predetermined term of office.

The system of government can also be determined by the relationship of the ministers in the executive (cabinet). The presidential cabinet is formed by the President so that the relationship pattern is hierarchical, while in a parliamentary system, the prime minister as chief executive has a collegial relationship with the ministers in the cabinet. Stepan and Skach argue that the cabinet is in a presidential system rather than ministers in a parliamentary system.<sup>17</sup> This shows that the composition of the cabinet in a presidential system is more flexible which is completely dependent on the President.

In a presidential system, the executive power is in the hands of the president and is known as the presidential power. Cheibub mentions three powers over which the President may have dominance in the budget process; the power to initiate the process of law-making in terms of the state budget, the power to amend the proposed state budget, and state expenditures in situations where no approval is obtained for the process of making laws related to the state budget.<sup>18</sup> In some presidential constitutions, the President is granted several legislative powers including a veto and the president's exclusive right to enact certain laws.

In the context of legislation, Cheibub argues that the President, as the executive, can dominate legislative initiatives in the most important policy-making areas because the President has the exclusive right to initiate the law-making process concerning the budget, taxes, and public administration. The presidential system shows a different pattern of relations with the parliamentary system. The presidential system tends to an independent executive (non-parliamentary executive) through the idea of separation and division of power.<sup>19</sup>

The idea of separation of powers is oriented towards independence and freedom, whereas the division of power is rooted in balance and control between the branches of power. The Presidential System stands on a power system based

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<sup>16</sup> Donald S. Lutz, *Principles or Constitutional Design*, Cambridge University Press, 2006,

<sup>17</sup> Alfred Stepan And Inoy Skacn, *Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism*, World Politics, Vol. 46 No. 1, October 1993,

<sup>18</sup> Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Reforming Presidential and Semi-Presidential Democracies*, Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas De La UNAM.

<sup>19</sup> Elgie, R. and Moestrup, *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, (London: Routledge, 2007), hal. 24

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on the separation of powers so that checks and balances are the key to maintaining effective and accountable presidentialism. However, the dominance and center of power on the President in terms of the quality of the head of state (nominal executive) as well as the head of government (real executive).

Although there is an argument that the two legitimacy between the President and the Legislator, each of which is directly elected by the people, has independent power and cannot interfere with each other, this is often considered a great potential for deadlock in the presidential system of government. However, the potential for the emergence of an authoritarian regime remains open, because most of the executive power is held by a single institution, namely the President.

According to Hector Fix-Fierro and Pedro Salazar-Ugarte there are two mechanisms to stabilize and prevent the presidential system from leading to an authoritarian regime. 1. By strengthening the ability of the president to influence the work of the legislature (strengthening the executive) and, 2. by strengthening the ability of legislators to influence the realm of government (increasing the powers of parliament). In addition, an alternative step to strengthen the Executive is to strengthen the president's veto power over laws made by the legislature; give preference to the initiation of the legislative process by the President (all such initiation applications must be approved or rejected within a limited time); give the President more power to issue decisions with legislative powers, or, ultimately, give the president more power to propose laws.

On the other hand, a mechanism to increase parliamentary power can be done by increasing the involvement of the legislature in the appointment of cabinet members, thereby holding the government accountable; or expand its authority to shape public policy. In contrast to the potential for authoritarian regimes or hyper-presidentialism, the possibility of weak presidentialism is very open due to problems with the party system, executive and legislative relations and the electoral system.

Mainwaring explained that multiparty presidentialism is likely to lead to deadlock between the executive and legislature and the difficulty of building interparty coalitions in presidential democracies, with damaging consequences for democratic stability.<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile, Juan Linz from a different point of view explains that the separate institutional design between legislative and executive powers causes one another to have independent actions that may conflict with one another.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Scott Mainwaring, *Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination*, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 26 No. 2, Sage Publications, 1993, h. 198-225.

<sup>21</sup> Juan J. Linz (Juan José), *The Perils of Presidentialism*, *Journal of Democracy* Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 1990, The Johns Hopkins University Press, h. 53



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The direct presidential election by the people, as well as a permanent term of office are the basis for the president's claim of legitimacy in dealing with the legislature. The existence of two legitimacy with each having independent power and cannot intervene with each other, is a great potential for a deadlock in the presidential government system. It was acknowledged by Cheibubb that the impasse of the presidential system was caused by the possibility of an elected president and members of the legislature controlling the majority of seats in the people's representative institutions from different parties. In such a situation, the presidential system does not have democratic principles that can break or break constitutional mechanisms, to resolve deadlocks such as dissolving members of parliament and immediately holding elections to form a new government.<sup>22</sup>

Hence the idea of trying to "purify". "strengthen" and make the presidential system effective or make the presidential system work at least cover five issues or indicators as follows:

- 1) General Election System;
- 2) Party System;
- 3) Cabinet maker and management;
- 4) Formation of Laws; and
- 5) List of President's powers in the Presidential system.

### **Multi-Party, Simultaneous Elections and the Tailcoat Effect**

An electoral system is a set of methods or rules for transferring electoral votes to a representative body. The electoral system is concerned with how the votes obtained in elections are translated in parliament by political parties and candidates. Furthermore, universal suffrage is a tool for achieving popular sovereignty designed to form a legitimate government and a means to articulate the people's profit aspirations.<sup>23</sup>

Departing from the mutual influence between the party system, the electoral system and the workings of the power relations of the President and the legislature. Mainwaring made the thesis that the combination of a multiparty system and a presidential system is something that is difficult and creates instability in the government. Mainwaring explained three reasons for the problem of the combination of a multiparty system and a presidential system, namely:<sup>24</sup>

- a. immobilism executive/legislative and such deadlock cannot destabilize democracy;

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<sup>22</sup> Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Minority Presidents, Deadlock Situations, and the Survival of Presidential Democracies*, Yale University, hal. 277-283

<sup>23</sup> Ibnu Tricahyo, *Reformasi Pemilu Menuju Pemisahan Pemilu Nasional dan Lokal*, (Malang: Intrans Publicizing, 2009), p. 6

<sup>24</sup> Scott Mainwaring, *Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination*, *Comparative Political Studies* 1993 Vol 26 No. 4,

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- b. more or less the same as bipartisan which leads to ideological polarization;
- c. difficulties of interparty coalition building in presidential democracy, with deleterious of consequences for democracy stability.

From another perspective, Juan Linz explains that the separate institutional design of the legislature and the executive leads to conflicting independent actions. The direct election of the president by the people and the term of office of the president provide the basis for the president's legitimacy to Congress. The existence of dual legitimacy, with independent powers and inability to interfere with each other, is likely to bring the presidential administration to a stalemate.<sup>25</sup>

Cheibub also expressed similar concerns that the deadlock in the presidential system is caused by the possibility that the elected president and members of parliament will control the majority of seats in the multiparty representative body. Presidential systems lack democratic principles and constitutional mechanisms to resolve deadlocks that parliamentary systems deserve, such as the need to dissolve parliament and hold elections to form a new government.<sup>26</sup>

Government instability and the survival of democracy are often blamed on deadlocks and lack of tools of power that can compel the legislature to equal double legitimacy (of the people). Later amendments to the 1945 Constitution, which were based on the concept of separation and division of power and the recognition of a presidential system, hoped to establish independence and equality, and checks and balances between the branches of government power.<sup>27</sup>

Mark P. Jones' research, as cited by Djayadi Hanan, can be considered to represent general findings about strengthening the presidential system. In one of the publications of his research results, Jones in 1995 stated: "...all evidence indicates the functioning of presidential systems is greatly enhanced when the president is provided with a majority or near majority in the legislature".<sup>28</sup> In other words, strengthening the presidential system is closely related to the availability of adequate political support in the legislature for a president. So how to create adequate political support in the midst of a plural party system?

One answer to this question is how to choose simultaneously at once. Does not separate parliamentary elections and presidential elections. The legal politics of simultaneous elections began when Effendi Ghazali submitted a judicial review

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<sup>25</sup> Juan J. Linz, *The Perils of Presidentialism*, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter 1990, The Johns Hopkins University Press,

<sup>26</sup> Jose Antonio Cheibub, *Minority Presidents, Deadlock Situations, And the Survival of Presidential Democracies*, Yale University, hal. 277-283

<sup>27</sup> Jimly Asshiddiqie, *Format kelembagasan Negara dan Pergeseran Kekuasaan Dalam UUD 1945*, (Yogyakarta: FH UII, 2005), p. 11

<sup>28</sup> Djayadi Hanan, Djayadi Hanan, *Memperkuat Presidensialisme Multipartai di Indonesia. Pemilu Serentak, Sistem Pemilu dan Sistem Kepartaian*, <http://puskapol.ui.ac>, accessed 2 November 2022.

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to the Concurrent Election Community Coalition against Law Number 42 of 2008 concerning Presidential Elections at the Constitutional Court (MK). The decision of the Constitutional Court Number 14/PUU-XI/2013, in its comprehensive interpretation, mentions four reasons for holding simultaneous elections: the electoral system and its relationship with the presidential government system election. the 1945 Constitution, the effectiveness and efficiency of general elections, as well as the right of citizens to vote wisely. Among these 4 reasons, the choice of a presidential system of government is the most fundamental reason with that:

In fact, the President has become very dependent on political parties which, according to the Court, can reduce the President's position in exercising government power according to the presidential system of government. Thus, according to the Mahakamah, the holding of the presidential election must avoid tactical political negotiations and bargaining for the sake of momentary interests, so as to create negotiations and strategic coalitions of political parties for long-term interests. This will make it more possible for the merger of political parties in a natural and strategic way so that in the long term it will ensure the simplification of political parties”.

The ratio decendi of simultaneous elections which was confirmed by the Constitutional Court from the Petitioner's argument was that "if the executive elections are held simultaneously or simultaneously during the legislative elections, it will cause a coattail effect, namely the (results) of the election of executive officials will affect the (results) of the election of legislative members, so that the victory of the The executive branch will be followed by the victory of the party or coalition of parties supporting the executive officer in the legislative election. Thus the possibility of devided government can be avoided so that the government resulting from the election will work effectively.

Jimly Asshiddiqie said the strategic benefits are:

- a. The government system is strengthened through “political separation” (decoupled) between the executive and legislative functions which are supposed to be balanced and balanced with each other;
- b. “Decoupling” has the potential to cause “devided government” or “split government” as a result of the head of government not controlling the majority of votes in the representative body, even though it is limited by the principle of non-compliance between parliament and the government;
- c. The “impeachment” system can only be implemented with strict conditions, legally and constitutionally, not for political reasons;
- d. To maintain the climate and dynamics of the “public policy debate” in the parliament.


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The first simultaneous election democratic party in 2019 is over and it is necessary to examine whether simultaneous elections on a coat-tail effect basis work well. The following are the results of the simultaneous elections for the DPR as follows:

<b>PARTAI POLITIK</b>	<b>PEROLEHAN HASIL SUARA (%)</b>
<b>PDI-P</b>	<b>19,33</b>
<b>GERINDRA</b>	<b>12,57</b>
<b>GOLKAR</b>	<b>12,31</b>
<b>PKB</b>	<b>9,69</b>
<b>DEMOKRAT</b>	<b>7,77</b>
<b>PKS</b>	<b>8,21</b>
<b>PAN</b>	<b>6,84</b>
<b>PPP</b>	<b>4,52</b>
<b>NASDEM</b>	<b>9,09</b>
<b>PERINDO</b>	<b>2,67</b>
<b>PSI</b>	<b>1,89</b>
<b>HANURA</b>	<b>1,54</b>
<b>PBB</b>	<b>0,79</b>
<b>PKPI</b>	<b>0,22</b>
<b>BERKARYA</b>	<b>2,09</b>
<b>GARUDA</b>	<b>0,5</b>

### Legislative Result in 2019



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the supporting parties. The data on the results of the presidential election shows the following:

**President Election Result in 2019**

<b>NAMA PASANGAN CALON</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>JUMLAH PROLEHAN SUARA</b>
<b>Ir. H. Joko Widodo- K.H. Ma'ruf Amin</b>	<b>55, 50</b>	<b>85.607.362.00</b>
<b>H. Prabowo Subianto – Sandiaga S. Uno</b>	<b>44, 5</b>	<b>68.650.239.00</b>

**Comparative Legislative Result in 2014 and 2019**

<b>PARTAI POLITIK</b>	<b>PEMILU 2014</b>	<b>STATUS</b>	<b>PEMILU 2019</b>	<b>STATUS</b>
<b>Partai Nasdem</b>	<b>6, 72</b>	<b>NAIK</b>	<b>9, 05</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</b>	<b>9,04</b>	<b>NAIK</b>	<b>9, 69</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</b>	<b>6, 79</b>	<b>NAIK</b>	<b>8, 21</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Partai PDIP</b>	<b>18, 95</b>	<b>NAIK</b>	<b>19, 33</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Partai Golkar</b>	<b>14, 75</b>	<b>TURUN</b>	<b>12, 31</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Partai Gerindra</b>	<b>11, 98</b>	<b>NAIK</b>	<b>12, 57</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Partai Demokrat</b>	<b>10, 19</b>	<b>TURUN</b>	<b>7, 77</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>PAN</b>	<b>7, 59</b>	<b>TURUN</b>	<b>6, 84</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</b>	<b>6, 53</b>	<b>TURUN</b>	<b>4, 52</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Partai Hanura</b>	<b>5, 26</b>	<b>TURUN</b>	<b>1, 54</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Partai Bulan Bintang</b>	<b>1, 46</b>	<b>TURUN</b>	<b>0, 79</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia</b>	<b>0, 91</b>	<b>TURUN</b>	<b>0, 22</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Perindo</b>	<b>Tidak Mengikuti Pemilu</b>	<b>BARU</b>	<b>2, 67</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>PSI</b>	<b>Tidak Mengikuti</b>	<b>BARU</b>	<b>1, 89</b>	<b>1</b>

	<b>Pemilu</b>			
<b>Berkarya</b>	<b>Tidak Mengikuti Pemilu</b>	<b>BARU</b>	<b>2,09</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Garuda</b>	<b>Tidak Mengikuti Pemilu</b>	<b>BARU</b>	<b>0,5</b>	<b>Tidak Berkoalisi</b>

Based on the data above, the following notes can be given:

1. Pairs of presidential candidates did not occur significantly for all supporting parties. PDI-P's vote gain in 2019 was only 0.38 percent higher than the 2014 election, even though PDI-P was Joko Widodo's proponent. Likewise, PKB where in 2014 the vote was 9.06 to 9.69 even though it was carrying a vice presidential candidate. The initial supporting parties for the presidential and vice presidential candidates generally benefited, such as PDI-P and PKB for the Joko Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin candidate pair and Gerindra for the presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto.
2. The Nasdem Party and PKS are exceptions in the sense that their vote increase is significant and even beyond prediction. This is a note that the party machine works in addition to the individual contributions of the candidates as a competition for open proportionality. This claim can prove that the presidential electoral effect does not necessarily have a positive impact on the vote acquisition of political parties.
3. In general, the party's vote acquisition has decreased for each party supporting the candidate pair. This could be an indication that there is no significant role and electoral power of the presidential and vice presidential candidates.
4. not working in the frame of simultaneous elections creates doubts about the purpose of simultaneous elections to strengthen presidentialism

## CONCLUSION

The tail-coat effect that does not work effectively coupled with the provisions in Law No. 7 of 2017 concerning General Elections regarding the nomination threshold, does not significantly prove the influence of simultaneous elections on governance in the power of the President. The Nomination Threshold in the Design of the Election Law actually creates a coalition of parties that has the potential to damage a healthy and accountable political system in accordance with the principles of a fair and honest election, namely the gathering of parties in one support for a presidential candidate which is then not matched by an opposition within the framework of Check and Balance.

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